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TEACHING THE POST-SEX GENERATION 
KERRI LYNN STONE* 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a trend that I have observed in the course of leading my classes in 
discussions about the kinds of behavior that may constitute unlawful 
discrimination: the emergence of an attitude among students that society is 
simply “post-sex,” or no longer in need of most or all anti-sex discrimination 
jurisprudence.1 Below, I detail my own approach to teaching and to raising and 
 
* Associate Professor, Florida International University College of Law. J.D., New York 
University School of Law; B.A., Columbia College, Columbia University. I would also like to 
thank my research assistants, Stephanie Harris, Ben Hefflinger, and Ingrid Cepero for all of their 
able assistance, as well as my husband Josh Stone and my son Dylan Stone for making the 
experience of writing this piece possible and fun. 
 1. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Teaching Employment Discrimination, 54 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 755, 756–57 (2010) (“Unlike many of their predecessors, this generation’s law students, . . . 
believe that we are past race. They have learned about racism as an evil that occurs only when 
perpetrators with bad intent target their hatred against people of differing races, instead of as a 
systemic force that is both attitudinal and institutional . . . . Similarly, they have grown up 
believing that women have equal access to promising opportunities within the workplace. When 
the female law students of this cohort think about ‘opting out’ of work outside the home, many of 
them truly believe that the choice will be theirs. Additionally, they look around their law school 
classrooms, seeing half of the room filled with women, and are affirmed in their belief of true 
gender equality.”); Kerri L. Stone, Decoding Civility, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 185, 
216–217 (2013) (posing the question as to why so many people believe that society is post-gender 
but the status gap still remains); Kerri L. Stone, Are We “Post-Gender?”, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 
28, 2011), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/02/are-we-post-gender.html. But cf. 
HART & MCINTURFF, Study #13127: NBC News/Wall Street Journal Survey, MSNBC, 17, 
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/A_Politics/13127%20APRIL%20NBC-WSJ%20 
Filled-in_1.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2013) (reporting that 46% of women in a survey stated that 
they had personally experienced discrimination because they are women); Revisiting the Mommy 
Wars, PEW SOCIAL TRENDS (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2008/09/15/revisit 
ing-the-mommy-wars/ (“A notably higher share of mothers (61%) than fathers (44%) of children 
under 18 say that discrimination against women is a serious problem.”); Three in Five Americans 
Say U.S. Has Long Way to Go to Reach Gender Equality, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (Aug. 16, 2010), 
http://multivu.prnewswire.com/mnr/harrisinteractive/44727/ (“Even more Americans (63%) agree 
that the U.S. still has a long way to go to reach complete gender quality [sic]. While three-
quarters of women (74%) agree with this, so do just over half of men (52%).”); Deborah Jordan 
Brooks, Job Equality Views: Gender Gap Still Wide, GALLUP (Aug. 27, 2002), http://www.gal 
lup.com/poll/6688/Job-Equality-Views-Gender-Gap-Still-Wide.aspx (“Thirty-four percent of men 
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conducting discussions about how anti-discrimination legislation and 
jurisprudence works in theory, in practice, and how it would/could work in an 
ideal world. I enjoy teaching students with a diversity of viewpoints. However, 
when I began to encounter a uniformity of views about the lack of a need for 
the protection of employees from sex discrimination, I found it necessary to 
revisit and think through my goals in and approach to these discussions, if for 
no other reason than the fact that students should be able to see both sides of 
issues, especially when the side with which they disagree reflects the current 
state of the law. 
At the Florida International University College of Law, I teach 
Employment Law, Employment Discrimination Law, and Labor Law, as well 
as a seminar about Title VII. These are classes in which students must engage 
regularly with issues like whether lewd behavior in a given factual scenario 
rises to the level of sexual harassment, when the law should step in and 
acknowledge that someone was treated in a certain way “because of” his or her 
sex, race, or other protected class membership when it is not obvious, and how 
to weigh the factors that dictate the result of a judicially created test, from the 
extent to which speech is protected in a public workplace, to whether someone 
is an employee versus an independent contractor. 
I.  “UP THE MIDDLE” 
My goals and philosophy for teaching these classes is relatively simple—I 
aim to teach, as I explain to my students, “right up the middle.” This 
conceptual “middle” refers to the courtroom aisle, the political spectrum, and 
anything else that spans or bifurcates the range of legitimate positions and 
standpoints that may be assumed in the successful practice of labor and 
employment law. Each member of the class ought to feel as prepared as 
possible to enter practice, having read, analyzed, and discussed the case law, 
legislation, and developments in the law, irrespective of whether they dream of 
working for plaintiffs or defendants, in public or private practice. My students 
understand from the outset that I will neither teach them nor test them on my 
personal politics or opinions. Rather, I aim to give them a comprehensive base 
of knowledge and skill to attain mastery of and facility with the law, with an 
emphasis on how each side of each case or debate will craft arguments, 
develop strategy, and marshal evidence. After all, the best thing that an 
aspiring plaintiff’s attorney can know going into a case is the defendant’s best 
strategy and arguments, and vice versa. Further, they learn quickly that they 
will study the law on several levels. On one hand, they will become well-
 
are very satisfied with the way women are treated in society, compared to only 18% of women. A 
similar gap exists when it comes to opinion on equality in the workplace. A majority of men 
(54%) feel that women have equal job opportunities with men, as do only 39% of women.”). 
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versed in the policy, contextual, historical, and theoretical underpinnings of the 
case law, legislation, and other sources of law and debate that we study. On the 
other hand, they will also learn the black letter law of the workplace as it 
currently exists. Finally, because they should be as practice ready as possible, 
each class will survey not only the topics on the syllabus as the casebooks 
present them, with relevant case law (usually appellate), legislation, and 
discussion, but the “real life strategies” for handling (or even preventing) these 
kinds of cases at, or even before, their inception. So, for example, my class will 
review not only the holding in a case in which an unlawful termination was 
alleged, but the process that went on under the auspices of the defendant prior 
to the termination: the handling of allegations, the conducting of 
investigations, and the affording of whatever “process” has been promised by 
law or policy. When we read the cases about disparate impact or systemic 
disparate treatment and statistics, we discuss which experts a good 
employment lawyer should have in her rolodex, how and when to employ 
them, and how they and their charts, number crunching, and testimony can 
help to educate a judge about everything from testing to statistical impact to 
industrial organizational psychology. When I call on students to recount facts 
of cases and identify issues, we often simulate a situation in which a busy 
partner needs to be briefed, thereby creating a need for students to parse their 
words carefully, articulate what they want to communicate precisely and in 
their own words, and, of course, to truly digest and understand what they are 
reading. 
All in all, the goal of my classes and the premise of my approach is that I 
want to produce informed, practice ready attorneys who not only know the 
law, but who have the skills to practice it—on either side of the aisle. It is thus 
really important that they become capable of at least understanding both sides 
of an issue, even if they don’t agree with one side of it. After all, as I tell my 
students, the law of employment discrimination is so fascinating, in part, 
because it is both so new and so slow and so wildly unpredictable in its 
evolution. I continually remind my students to think about how long it can take 
for the law to resolve what sounds like it should have been a rudimentary issue 
in this area of law. For example, when my employment discrimination class 
covers age discrimination, we note that the legislative centerpiece of this area 
of law, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, or ADEA, was passed in 
1967.2 The two major causes of action used in almost all employment 
discrimination cases, disparate treatment,3 and disparate impact,4 each had 
 
 2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006). 
 3. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (“Disparate 
treatment . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats 
some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin.”); Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 807 (11th Cir. 2010) (en 
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workable frameworks that had been propounded by the U.S. Supreme Court 
and were being used by lower courts by 1973.5 The notion of a so-called 
“mixed motive” claim/jury instruction, set forth by the Supreme Court in the 
Title VII context in 1989,6 and enshrined in that statute two years later,7 also 
started being used by lower courts in contexts outside of Title VII, like age 
discrimination cases, immediately thereafter.8 However, it is interesting to note 
the years in which the Supreme Court finally furnished definitive answers to 
what appeared to be the most basic of questions: Are disparate impact claims 
available under the ADEA? (Yes, decided in 2005).9 Is a mixed motive jury 
instruction ever appropriate in an ADEA disparate treatment claim? (No, 
decided in 2009).10 
The area of Title VII litigation is no different. Although, as discussed, 
disparate impact and disparate treatment claims have been mainstays of 
employment discrimination litigation since the early 1970’s, it was not until 
2009 that the Supreme Court addressed the issue of their interplay and 
specifically, when an entity may lawfully engage in disparate treatment to 
stave off a claim of disparate impact (when it has a substantial basis in 
evidence to substantiate its fear that the disparate impact claim is colorable).11 
It is truly the case that the employment law and employment discrimination 
students of today will be engaged with essential issues and the fundamental 
developments in the law of tomorrow. This is important to communicate to 
students, both to stoke their enthusiasm for the study and practice of this 
specialty, but also to explain to them why more theoretical policy-based 
 
banc) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)) (“In disparate treatment, an employer discriminates 
against a worker ‘with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of’ the individual’s membership in a protected category.”). 
 4. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (1977) (“[D]isparate impact. . .involve[s] 
employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact 
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.”); 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (“[D]isparate impact [is] . . . a 
facially neutral practice, adopted without discriminatory intent, [which] may have effects that are 
indistinguishable from intentionally discriminatory practices.”). 
 5. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing the 
burden-shifting framework for disparate treatment cases); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424, 432 (1971) (establishing a disparate impact framework). 
 6. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
 8. See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 316 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
the mixed-motives analysis is applicable in ADEA cases); EEOC v. Waterfield-Rohr Casket Co., 
364 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that an ADEA claim may be established through the 
“mixed-motive” framework); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 362 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that the mixed-motive instruction governs in an ADEA case). 
 9. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005). 
 10. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 169–70 (2009). 
 11. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 592 (2009). 
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discussions, that go beyond what the current state of the law is, to why and 
how the law got to the state that it is in and ideas about what, proscriptively, 
makes the most sense for its future and evolution. 
Similarly, it is also important when teaching in this area of the law to 
explain how policy debates and struggles among judges, and even between the 
Supreme Court and Congress can cause sharp veers and repeated vacillation in 
the law. For all my students know, their in-class theorizing about the wisdom 
of a legal doctrine could be the experience they draw from when they ask a 
court to abandon or modify it in practice not long from now. And yet my 
students do not need to learn my or anyone else’s opinion on anything; they 
need to form their own opinions and to open their minds to understand others’, 
especially when it comes to the kind of boundary pushing and new frontiers 
that courts will foreseeably find themselves grappling with in the near future. 
II.  THE PERIPHERY OF TITLE VII 
I found myself, then, challenged to at least open the minds of some of my 
students when it came to teaching what I refer to as the “periphery of Title 
VII.” Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the centerpiece of employment 
discrimination litigation, prohibits discriminatory treatment against individuals 
with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment when that 
treatment is “because of” protected class membership.12 Squarely within this 
prohibition are acts like firing or demoting someone where it can be shown via 
a clear demonstration (like a “smoking gun” admission)13 or even via a logical 
deduction (like a scenario in which context and circumstances versus more 
direct evidence make it apparent) that protected class membership was the 
reason for the decision. Similarly, in sexual harassment cases, the harassment 
must, among other things, be “because of” the victim’s sex, whether that 
means that she was propositioned repeatedly or faced with a barrage of 
disparaging comments that reference her sex.14 In disparate impact cases, 
 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 13. See, e.g., Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d 506, 510, 514 (3rd Cir. 2004) 
(holding that statement by owner’s vice president to manager’s coworkers, that vice president 
wanted to fire manager and replace her with a “young chippie,” constituted direct evidence of 
discrimination); Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 336, 340 (3rd Cir. 2002) (finding that 
decision maker’s statement that he was “looking for younger single people” and that as a 
consequence, Fakete “wouldn’t be happy [at Aetna] in the future” as direct evidence of age 
discrimination); Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that 
decision maker’s remarks to employee at the time of the firing that “she would be happier at 
home with her children” provided direct evidence of discrimination). 
 14. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2012) (“Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation 
of section 703 of title VII.”); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) 
(“Without question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the 
subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminates on the basis of sex.’”); Henson v. City of 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
228 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:223 
facially neutral policies and practices that confer a disparate or 
disproportionate impact on a protected class of individuals, are called into 
question, and will be actionable unless the employer can show that they are 
business necessities.15 Even if they are shown to be necessary, the defendant 
may still need to make the practice less intrusive, if there is a way to do so. The 
effect of the policy or practice on an individual is said to occur “because of” 
the individual’s protected class status, even though there is no intentional 
discrimination at play. 
But what about scenarios that are significantly less clear? My research 
agenda exhorts me to engage with and explore these issues constantly, and I 
believe that there is room for them, even in a traditional employment 
discrimination survey class. As I explain to my class, the law of Title VII is so 
relatively new and its jurisprudence so continually (and so slowly) evolving, 
that learning about and thinking about the next frontiers of discerning and 
capturing harm that befalls employees “because of” their sex or race or other 
protected class status, is more than just an exercise in musing. It is a chance to 
really think about the role that they might actually have in advancing or 
changing the law once they reach practice. On one hand, Title VII, as courts so 
frequently intone, is not a “civility code,” whereby every slight is actionable.16 
On the other hand, in a world in which social science and psychology inform 
societal—and judicial—understandings of things like unconscious bias, one 
should not be so quick to deem a “because of” allegation as too attenuated. 
Thus, my seminar focuses on and my survey courses cover the “periphery 
of Title VII”—those scenarios, cases, and doctrines that press and challenge 
the contours of the statute and the domain of that and whom it regulates. We 
talk about behaviors and issues that traverse the spectrum between that which 
is clearly covered by Title VII and that which is clearly outside its reach. So, 
for example, the Supreme Court has held that Title VII is violated when a 
woman is not selected for a promotion as a result of having been deemed by a 
decision maker as “too manly” in her appearance and affect to conform to the 
 
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 (11th Cir. 1982) (“An employer may not require sexual 
considerations from an employee as a quid pro quo for job benefits.”). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U. S., 431 U.S. 324, 
335 n.15 (1977) (“[D]isparate impact. . .involve[s] employment practices that are facially neutral 
in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another 
and cannot be justified by business necessity.”). 
 16. See Kerri Lynn Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 591, 623 (2011) 
[hereinafter Stereotyping] (“Title VII was not designed to be a civility code; Congress certainly 
did not design it to prevent employers from levying certain legitimate criticisms at certain 
individuals.”); See e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006); Oncale 
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 
U.S. 775, 788 (1998). 
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stereotype of a feminine, beautiful, polite, and deferential woman.17 But does 
that mean that subsequently, a woman who is not hired because she lacks a 
“Midwestern girl look” has a viable cause of action?18 What about a gay man 
who is harassed for being too effeminate and not conforming to the stereotype 
of a typical heterosexual male?19 
Indeed, courts have varied in their responses to these and other related 
questions.20 To take another example, sexual harassment consisting of sexual 
overtures made toward a victim or of pejorative language directed at a victim 
that references her sex and is said to be “because of sex” and actionable.21 But 
workplace bullying that is “neutral” and evenly meted out, is wholly lawful,22 
as is a certain amount of general vulgarity.23 What, however, about “gendered 
 
 17. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). 
 18. See Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1041–42 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(finding employer’s criticism of employee for lack of “prettiness” and the “Midwestern girl look” 
may be evidence of wrongful sex stereotyping). 
 19. See Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc. 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3rd Cir. 2009) (“There is no 
basis in the statutory or case law to support the notion that an effeminate heterosexual man can 
bring a gender stereotyping claim while an effeminate homosexual man may not.”); see generally 
Stereotyping, supra note 16, at 641–42 (describing court treatment of cases in which “a 
homosexual plaintiff alleged a failure to comport with the gender stereotypes of a decision-
maker.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Love v. Motiva Enters., No. 07–5970, 2008 WL 4286662, at *9 (E.D. La. Sept. 
17, 2008) (rejecting plaintiff’s allegation of gender stereotyping by finding that someone’s idea of 
a “liberated, physically fit woman by definition cannot constitute a stereotype, which is based on 
society’s general ideas about traits commonly thought to be shared by persons of the same 
physical type.”); Moren v. Progress Energy, Inc., No. 8:07-cv-1676-T-17, 2008 WL 3243860, at 
*5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2008) (finding plaintiff’s allegation that he was harassed because of the 
perception that he was “a particular kind of man” as vague and cryptic and insufficient to show 
that the alleged harassment was based on plaintiff’s perceived failure to conform to a masculine 
gender role); Zhao v. State Univ. of N.Y., 472 F. Supp. 2d 289, 309–10 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting 
that both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have held that decisions resulting from 
“stereotyped” impressions or assumptions about the characteristics or abilities of women violate 
Title VII; further adding: “These same principles undoubtedly apply with equal force to racial and 
ethnic stereotyping.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 782 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753–54 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993); 
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986); EEOC v. Mgmt. Hospitality of 
Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422, 429 (7th Cir. 2012); Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 
1260 (10th Cir. 2005); Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2003); Gentry 
v. Export Packaging Co., 238 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 
F. Supp. 847, 874–75 (D. Minn. 1993). 
 22. See Kerri L. Stone, Floor to Ceiling: How Setbacks and Challenges to the Anti-Bullying 
Movement Pose Challenges to Employers Who Wish to Ban Bullying, 23 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 23. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (citations omitted) (“‘Simple teasing’, offhand comments, 
and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 
‘terms and conditions of employment.’”); Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
230 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:223 
bullying,” whereby the standard for actionable harassment is clearly not met, 
although a woman is made to feel alienated or diminished in the workplace 
because of her sex, nonetheless? What about a situation in which a victim is 
forced to continually observe the harassment of another woman, but is not 
directly harassed, herself? 
By getting my students to think about the outer parameters or contours of 
Title VII, both (to an extent) in my survey classes and in my seminar, I want to 
challenge them to craft arguments based on logical extensions of existing law. 
Since employment discrimination jurisprudence is always trying to outpace the 
behavior that it regulates, it remains dynamic and continually evolves. In fact, I 
often point to the dates on recent cases that resolve issues that seem so 
rudimentary that one would have thought they had been resolved decades 
earlier. Whether a student wants to press the boundaries of existing law on 
behalf of plaintiffs or to represent defendant employers and prevent incursions 
into the law, she must understand how to deploy policy arguments and marshal 
arguments from existing precedent to argue in either direction with the same 
facility. Along those lines, I tell my students that it is of no moment to me or to 
their classmates which way their personal views or ambitions skew; they 
should leave the class prepared to pursue whatever career they desire and with 
more than a working knowledge of what goes into representing the other side. 
Students will sometimes voice views on a variety of topics that might 
alienate others in the class, and like other professors, I work and strive to 
maintain an atmosphere of openness, respect, and civility during class 
discussions. The delicate balance of all that goes into doing this could be the 
topic of its own paper, but this paper is about teaching the “periphery of Title 
VII,” (and other employment discrimination statutes), how to navigate their 
ever-changing boundaries and having students at least understand the 
arguments on both sides of the attendant debates, when you are teaching a 
generation of law students that contains many members who seem to believe 
that the law—and the society that it seeks to regulate—is “post-sex.”24 
 
Cir. 1995) (“The concept of sexual harassment is designed to protect working women from the 
kind of male attentions that can make the workplace hellish for women. . . . It is not designed to 
purge the workplace of vulgarity.”). 
 24. See Sarah E. Whitney, I Can Be Whoever I Want to Be: Alias and The Post-Feminist 
Rhetoric of Choice, GENDERS.ORG, 5, http://www.genders.org/g57/g57_whitney.html (last visited 
Aug. 13, 2013) (“[P]ost-feminism is a popularly understood discourse, growing in voice since the 
1980s, which believes that gender equity has been fully achieved, and consequently that feminist 
activism is neither necessary nor desired.”); Elaine J. Hall & Marnie Salupo Rodriguez, The Myth 
of Postfeminism, 17 GENDER & SOC’Y 878, 880 (2003) (“By uncritically declaring that gender 
equality exists in the 1990s, the backlash casts the women’s movement as irrelevant. . . . [T]he 
backlash fosters the development of antifeminist attitudes.”); Stephanie Sipe, C. Douglas Johnson 
& Donna K. Fisher, University Students’ Perceptions of Gender Discrimination in the 
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III.  THE POST-SEX GENERATION 
It appears that the term “post-racial” became increasingly common about 
six years ago with the candidacy and subsequent election of President Barack 
Obama.25 Such a term can mean, as posited by author Ralph Eubanks, “race is 
no longer an issue or an impediment to progress in American society,” or to 
indicate “a color-blind society where race is not an issue. We are all 
Americans, and we're just completely color blind.”26 The term, according to 
Duke University professor Mark Anthony Neal, is often used to mean that 
conversations about race have been obviated by integration and the affording 
of racial equality in society.27 In other words, the message conveyed is that the 
impediments to equality have all but been removed, and that society has grown 
fatigued of the conversation.28 
Although there has been considerable backlash in response to this attitude, 
with movements like the “After Race Project,” whose goal is to “rebut the 
notion that we have arrived at the promised land where, as a society, we have 
finally moved beyond race,” taking hold and gaining momentum.29 Those who 
subscribe to these movements term post-racialism as noxious and nefarious, 
 
Workplace: Reality Versus Fiction, 84.6 J. EDUC. & BUS. 339, 339 (2009) (finding that students 
believe they are entering a gender-neutral workplace). 
 25. See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace 
Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1224–25 (2011) (stating that “[t]he race between Barack Obama 
and Hillary Clinton for the 2008 Democratic nomination for president caused many to ask 
whether the United States has moved beyond equality”); Tyrone Forman, Beyond Prejudice? 
Young Whites’ Racial Attitudes in Post Civil Rights America, 1976-2000 (2010), http://userwww. 
service.emory.edu/~tforman/working/Forman_Beyond_Prejudice_Web.pdf (“In fact, a cursory 
review of news articles might lead one to conclude that young Whites have moved completely 
beyond the prejudicial attitudes espoused by their parents and grandparents to become truly 
colorblind.”); Abigail Thernstrom & Stephan Thernstrom, Taking Race out of the Race, L.A. 
TIMES (Mar. 2, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/02/opinion/op-thernstrom2 (“Today, 
it is even clearer that race has become less of a factor in voting. The high level of white votes for 
Obama strongly suggests that other black candidates facing overwhelmingly white constituencies 
can do well.”); Donna Brazile, Obama a Marker on Post-Racial Path, CNN (Feb. 21, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/21/opinion/brazile-black-history-crossroads; Shelby Steele, 
Obama’s Post-Racial Promise, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/news/opin 
ion/opinionla/la-oe-steele5-2008nov05,0,6049031.story; Under Obama, Is America ‘Post 
Racial?’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/21/un 
der-obama-is-america-post-racial; Marc Fisher, With Obama, Not a Post-Racial Nation, but 
Something More Complex, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2013), http://articles.washington 
post.com/2013-01-21/national/36473165_1_barack-obama-white-house-first-black-president. 
 26. The ‘Post Racial’ Conversation, One Year In, NPR (Jan. 18, 2010, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122701272. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Robert S. Chang, What Comes After Gender?, 31 PACE L. REV. 818, 819 (2011). 
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“build[ing] on colorblindness in order to manage diversity to maintain the 
racial status quo.”30 
The term “post-sex,” or “post-feminism,” and its discourse, then, like the 
idea of post-racialism, has been characterized as somewhat ineffable, much 
like feminism, itself, “a discourse that, like the proverbial baby elephant, is 
difficult to describe, but you know it when you see it.”31 Moreover, this 
sentiment has become as pervasive as it is hard to articulate, with teachers in 
the United Kingdom reporting that a good deal of the students that they see, 
“male and female, seem reluctant to accept that gender inequality exists. This 
is partly due to students not yet having experienced discrimination in the 
workplace and also the result of a discourse often referred to as ‘post 
feminism.’”32 While the aspiration of a world in which “sex category matters 
not at all beyond reproduction; [and] economic and familial roles would be 
equally available to persons of any gender,” have been lauded, it has, by 
almost all accounts, not been achieved.33 That notwithstanding, I have 
witnessed, in my classes, the rise of an insistence that sex category does not 
matter and a belief that attempts to look at context to ascertain whether 
something that appears neutral might have a sex-based effect or undergirding 
are almost categorically inappropriate. 
IV.  ANN HOPKINS AND THE POST-SEX GENERATION 
One interesting topic in the employment discrimination curriculum that 
navigates the parameters of Title VII is that of stereotyping. The law is so 
unclear on when and how, precisely stereotyping constitutes evidence of 
unlawful discrimination that many scholars, myself included, have written on 
the subject. The seminal case on sex stereotyping as unlawful discrimination is 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Susan Durbin & Steve Fleetwood, Gender Inequality in Employment: Editors’ 
Introduction, 29 EQUAL., DIVERSITY, & INCLUSION: AN INT’L J. 221, 221–22 (2010). 
 32. Id. at 221; see also Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1, at 760 (“As with any matter, 
teaching about workplace discrimination can be difficult when much of the audience has not held 
a ‘real’ job.”). 
 33. SHELLEY PACHOLOK, INTO THE FIRE: DISASTER AND THE REMAKING OF GENDER 102 
(2013) (citing Candace West & Don H. Zimmerman, Accounting for Doing Gender, 23 GENDER 
& SOC’Y 112, 117–18 (2009); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress 
and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 
2542 (1994) (“Despite the progress made under Title VII in eliminating barriers to women’s 
access to equal employment opportunities, the Act has never kept up with the expectations many 
have had for it. At any given time, there seems to be a significant gap between what the law finds 
unacceptable under Title VII and what scholars and advocates contend the Act should prohibit. A 
gap between a law’s reach and the aspirations of those who seek to use it to accomplish 
substantial societal reform is a common enough phenomenon, but this is small consolation, and 
critics look for explanations.”). 
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Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.34 In that case, the plaintiff proffered evidence 
and expert testimony to establish that her allegedly discriminatory non-
selection was influenced by, if not born of impermissible sex stereotyping—the 
expressed sentiment that she was too masculine in her appearance and affect 
for the position at issue.35 Specifically, the Court explained, “In the specific 
context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a 
woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of 
gender.”36 
The Supreme Court, however, provided virtually no guidance regarding 
precisely what a legal doctrine known as “stereotyping” would look like in 
detail. Essentially, the Court said that the case it was examining was resolved 
easily enough without its needing to limit the “possible ways of proving that 
stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment decision.”37 Moreover, 
the Court expressly declined to “decid[e] here which specific facts, ‘standing 
alone,’ would or would not establish a plaintiff's case.”38 Declining to give the 
lower courts much more aid than that in ascertaining when or how employers’ 
stereotyping would engender a Title VII violation, the Court seemed to take a 
“we'll-know-it-when-we-see-it” approach to sex stereotyping: 
It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an 
aggressive female employee as requiring “a course at charm school.” Nor . . . 
does it require expertise in psychology to know that, if an employee's flawed 
“interpersonal skills” can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of 
lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex and not her interpersonal skills that 
has drawn the criticism.39 
When I teach Hopkins in my survey or seminar classes, I make mention of 
the lower courts’ disagreement and inconsistencies as to its proper application 
when a member of a protected class alleges that she was not seen as 
conforming with a desired stereotype for that class. I provide examples of 
cases in which courts have been receptive to arguments crafted around the 
Hopkins premise, like that with the male plaintiff who, in the course of being 
fired for an ostensibly legitimate reason (complaints of sexual harassment), 
was told that because he was a man, he probably did what he was accused of in 
any event, and no one would believe him,40 and that with the female plaintiff 
 
 34. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 35. Id. at 235–36 (“Dr. Susan Fiske, . . . testified at trial that the partnership selection 
process at Price Waterhouse was likely influenced by sex stereotyping.”). 
 36. Id. at 250. 
 37. Id. at 251–52. 
 38. Id. at 252. 
 39. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 256. 
 40. Sassaman v. Gamache, 566 F.3d 307, 311 (2nd Cir. 2009). See Stereotyping, supra note 
16, at 623 (referencing the tautology of “you’re a man; you probably did it anyway”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
234 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:223 
who alleged that she was terminated because she did not have “that 
Midwestern girl look.”41 I also tell them about those plaintiffs who met with 
judicial resistance to their proffering of stereotype evidence and their 
invocation of Hopkins, like the male plaintiff who, in the course of being fired 
from his job as a substitute teacher for an ostensibly legitimate reason (his 
borderline inappropriate interactions with female students), was told that he 
was “too macho.”42 These cases force the students to do several things. In the 
course of attempting to reconcile them and either discern a cohesive rule or 
articulate what such a rule would ideally say, the students must think critically 
about the purpose of Title VII, when and how stereotyping should incur or 
bespeak liability, and the comportment of various arguments with what the 
Court attempted to do in Hopkins. 
In class, I like to devote time to a discussion of how to reconcile courts’ 
disparate takes on this issue and of how we might forecast future trends in this 
area. I also like to point out how even within the adjudication of a single case, 
reasonable federal judges persistently disagree as to how and when a 
stereotyping argument is cognizable, both when they are on the same court 
(when a judge on an appeals panel dissents, for example), or different ones 
(when a district court is overruled, or when a judge examines, but then rejects 
authority from another jurisdiction). I also like to observe that looking at cases 
in which men, who are not a traditionally marginalized or disadvantaged 
protected class, bring stereotyping claims, but experience different outcomes, 
the students can, perhaps, examine the merits and drawbacks to recognizing 
Hopkins/stereotyping arguments as cognizable. I also try to incorporate current 
legal news by finding cases that have been recently filed or are pending, and 
because many, if not most of my students have had work experience, I invite 
them to ask questions or illustrate points informed by their own experiences, if 
they are comfortable doing so. 
One year, a female student disclosed to the class “that she had been told by 
her boss at work that she was ‘too girly’ to succeed at the company.”43 She 
quickly added the boss had “‘no problem with women,’ though, and he had 
readily hired and promoted numerous other women.”44 I then questioned my 
class: “if this woman were to suffer an adverse action at the hands of this 
boss,” could she make out a case of unlawful discrimination by using this 
evidence?45 Although I was hoping to generate a robust debate, I was assuming 
 
 41. Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1036 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 42. Lautermilch v. Findlay City Schs., 314 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 43. Colin Miller, Article of Interest: Kerri L. Stone’s Clarifying Stereotype, FEMINIST LAW 
PROFESSORS (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2011/04/article-of-interest-
kerri-l-stones-clarifying-stereotype/. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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that at least some students would say that she could. This was not the case. One 
(male) student contended, “Employment is at will. If this guy really has a good 
record with women and he has singled her out because of the way in which she 
comes across to him, that’s his prerogative.”46 Another student countered, 
“What about Hopkins? Isn’t that gender stereotyping?”47 Another (female) 
student weighed in: “If this woman were held back while many other women 
were not, how could the issue be tied to her sex and not to particularities of her 
personality?”48 Others agreed: “It’s about her being girly. Not the fact that 
she’s a woman at all.” One after the other, they responded that “employment is 
at will,” and that “he clearly doesn’t have a problem with her sex.” “It’s an 
interpersonal problem,” they said; “he has every prerogative to dislike the way 
in which she acts and to tell her.” 
I spent the next 35 minutes trying, in vain, to get them to at least see that 
the word “girly,” rather than being purely descriptive, as they saw it, was, at 
the very least “gendered,” and could raise flags with respect to any 
discrimination analysis, irrespective of which way it came out.49 
I was struck by how vehemently my students, especially the females in the 
class, wanted to press the issue and assert the right of an employer to exclude 
from its workplace those who possess certain characteristics, without thinking 
about how and when (or if) this might offend the law or traditional notions of 
fairness and equality. To the extent that the word “girly” bespoke 
characteristics separate and apart from the sex of the employee, the students’ 
point seems like it should be well-taken. Immature, shrill, meek, or vacuous 
employees of either sex or of any background typically don’t fare well in most 
jobs. But what of those who only see a word like “girly” as a descriptive word, 
wholly divorceable from its inherently gendered nature? 
We talked a bit about theory, feminist theory, and the so-called “waves” of 
feminism that has had subscribers alternately advancing women’s interests 
through the theoretical approach of formal equality, through a vehicle that 
touted the differences between the sexes, by focusing on the imbalance of 
power vis-à-vis men and women, and, in the “third wave” by embracing 
women’s sexuality and “girlie culture,” as well as “embracing individual 
experiences and making personal stories political.”50 I exhorted them to think 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Miller, supra note 43. 
 49. See Cheryl B. Preston, Subordinated Stills: An Empirical Study of Sexist Print 
Advertising and Its Implications for Law, 15 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 229, 257 (2006) (“Being 
envisioned as ‘girls’ and ‘girlie’ may be fashionable in some circles, but notwithstanding this 
effort to reclaim and empower these terms, they retain overwhelmingly negative connotations and 
usages.”). 
 50. Kathy A. Thomack, Centering Men’s Experience: Norah Vincent’s Self-Made Man 
Complicates Feminist Legal Theorists’ Views of Gender, 15 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 28 (2006). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
236 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:223 
about how, irrespective of whether they believed any, all or none of these 
theories or their underlying goals to be viable, the word “girly,” as used by a 
critical supervisor, might bear upon sex in some way. I encouraged them to 
think about how using slurs reserved for women or relating to women’s 
anatomy when talking to or describing men actually bespeaks sexism and 
misogyny.51 
The (near entire) class persisted in decrying a view of the word “girly” that 
evinced any sort of sexism or bias. That’s when, I decided to try a different 
approach. “Okay. Let’s change the example here. What if a firm had a 
spectacular record of hiring and promoting members of a certain minority 
racial group—let’s say Asian Americans, and let’s say in numbers greater than 
the group exists in the labor pool. But one day, one guy is pulled aside and told 
that he’s ‘too ethnic’ seeming to succeed at the company. Title VII 
problem?”52 
I paused, and watched most of the students look visibly uncomfortable.53 
“Good, I exclaimed. You’re bristling. You’re uncomfortable.” “Well,” replied 
one student, “that’s a really offensive thing for a boss or a supervisor to say.”54 
“Okay,” I answered, “but anchor your analysis to Title VII. Offensive doesn’t 
mean actionable, and well-intentioned doesn’t mean lawful; you know that.”55 
He struggled. 
It took a while, but slowly, the students found their way back to Title VII. 
We circled back to a discussion of stereotyping, the Hopkins case, and what it 
meant to be the “wrong type” of protected class member (woman, minority, 
etc.).56 With some prompting, one student recalled a case that we had studied 
weeks prior, Connecticut v. Teal, and how the Supreme Court in that case had 
 
 51. See Colleen M. Keating, Extending Title VII Protection to Non-Gender-Conforming 
Men, 4 MOD. AM. 82, 84 (2008) (describing “a 2004 incident in which California governor, 
Arnold Schwarzenegger, criticized his political opponents by calling them ‘girlie men.’ . . . [H]e 
was accusing them of being weak or ineffective. . . . [This] statement implies that the only people 
who belong in positions of power are ‘real’ men, who are physically strong, macho, and 
aggressive. The underlying assumption is that women—and men who are too much like 
women—cannot perform effective work. . . . [T]his ‘disfavoring of characteristics gendered 
feminine may work to the systematic detriment of women and thus should be analyzed as a form 
of sex discrimination.’”); Toni Calasanti, Kathleen F. Slevin & Neal King, Ageism and 
Feminism: From “Et Cetera” to Center, 18 NAT’L WOMEN’S STUD. ASS’N 13, 15 (2006) 
(“[T]erms related to girls and women, such as ‘sissy’ and ‘girly,’ are used to put men and boys 
down and reinforce women’s inferiority.”). 
 52. Miller, supra note 43. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Stereotyping, supra note 16, at 624 (discussing Hopkins as being “the wrong type of 
woman”). 
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rejected the so-called “bottom line” defense.57 This meant that as per the Court, 
“It is clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide 
an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, without regard to 
whether members of the applicant’s race are already proportionately 
represented in the work force,” and that “Congress never intended to give an 
employer license to discriminate against some employees on the basis of race 
or sex merely because he favorably treats other members of the employees’ 
group.”58 
Although decided in the context of a disparate impact case, Teal was 
instructive in our discussion, in that it reinforced the point that it is 
incongruous with Title VII’s objectives and workings to construe the 
discriminatory treatment of an individual somehow negated or neutralized by 
the retention and advancement of other members of that individual’s protected 
class. The class remained divided, however, as to what, precisely, is conveyed 
by the use of a word like “girly.” We did proceed to discuss what might be 
drawn from the very fact that the word and other gendered words’ usage in 
society was so entrenched and pervasive as to have become synonymous with 
neutral (or at least less gendered) words and severable from the context of sex 
or gender. 
V.  SIGN OF THE TIMES? 
Over the past few years, I have seen much more evidence of the view that 
we are, somehow, “past feminism,” and that laws that regulate the entrance of 
sex bias (especially in subtle ways) into decision making are simply 
unnecessary and intrusive. Again, there is nothing wrong with continually 
questioning the necessity for or relevance of the current level of vigilance 
required by the law and thoughtfully debating its retraction. There is certainly 
nothing wrong with concluding, especially in a close case that hovers on the 
periphery of Title VII’s domain, that the goals of the law are best served by 
having it not apply. But what I have seen in class are tenacious refusals to 
entertain the notion that certain behavior or speech alleged to be neutral could 
even conceivably be gendered. 
So, for example, in more recent years when I introduce the topic of 
“gendered bullying”59 that is either focused on women or is tinged with 
gendered, alienating, or sexual references, I have been met with the reaction 
that women need to simply “toughen up.” A concrete example of where this 
has come up is when I teach the case of Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, 
 
 57. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982). 
 58. Id. at 454–55. 
 59. Kerri Lynn Stone, From Queen Bees and Wannabes to Worker Bees: Why Gender 
Considerations Should Inform the Emerging Law of Workplace Bullying, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 35, 59 (2009). 
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Inc., a case in which an en banc court held that, contrary to the holding of the 
lower court and much of conventional belief on the subject, actionable sexual 
harassment can occur where the victim is not targeted and in which simple, 
alleged “gender neutral” vulgarity engenders the harassing environment.60 In 
that case, the plaintiff had to deal with “gender-derogatory language addressed 
specifically to women as a group in the workplace. Her co-workers used such 
language to refer to or to insult individual females with whom they spoke on 
the phone or who worked in a separate area of the branch.”61 Moreover, the 
plaintiff was forced to hear played in her workspace on a daily basis “a crude 
morning show” on the office radio.62 This show “featured . . . regular 
discussions of women’s anatomy, a graphic discussion of how women’s 
nipples harden in the cold, and conversations about the size of women’s 
breasts.”63 She was also subjected to, among other things, crude and 
pornographic images displayed on co-workers’ computer screens, though she 
was never personally singled out for targeted sex-based abuse, she was forced 
to observe her only female co-worker be so targeted and attacked.64 When her 
complaints fell on deaf ears, and the behavior did not cease, she eventually 
resigned and sued.65 
The district court found that summary judgment against her was 
appropriate66 for what were largely the same reasons my class did: the speech 
was not directed towards the plaintiff, specifically; and because the crude 
behavior occurred before all employees, both men and women were afforded 
equal treatment. Thus, the plaintiff was never “intentionally singled out for 
adverse treatment because of her sex,” and the behavior and creation of the 
environment were not actionable.67 My students, upon reading the facts of the 
case, were similarly persuaded that this was not a case of intentional, sex-based 
harassment, but rather one of general, commonplace crudeness and that rather 
than push what they saw as the boundaries of Title VII, this and other similar 
would-be plaintiffs needed to toughen up or find a workplace that they would 
find more palatable. 
 
 60. Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 813–14 (11th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc). 
 61. Id. at 804. For example, “[h]er co-workers, she claimed, regularly used curse words such 
as ‘fuck,’ ‘fucker,’ and ‘asshole.’ Id. at 804. They used the intensely offensive epithet ‘Jesus 
fucking Christ,’ and the terms ‘fucking asshole,’ ‘fucking jerk,’ and ‘fucking idiot.’ Id. They also 
discussed sexual topics such as masturbation and bestiality. Id. 
 62. Id. at 804. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Reeves, 594 F.3d at 806. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Reeves 
acknowledged that “Title VII is not a civility code,” and the “bedrock 
principle” that “not all profane or sexual language or conduct will constitute 
discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment.”68 However, the 
court held that while: 
[e]ven gender-specific terms cannot give rise to a cognizable Title VII claim if 
used in a context that plainly has no reference to gender, . . . when a co-worker 
calls a female employee a bitch, the word is gender-derogatory. . . . [T]he 
terms “bitch” and “slut” are “more degrading to women than to men.”69 
The court thus concluded that “[c]alling a female colleague a ‘bitch’ is 
firmly rooted in gender. It is humiliating and degrading based on sex.”70 
Moreover, the court held that a plaintiff can maintain a viable hostile work 
environment claim in certain circumstances, despite the fact that she was not, 
herself, the direct target of the harassing behavior.71 According to the court: 
It is enough to hear co-workers on a daily basis refer to female colleagues as 
“bitches,” “whores” and “cunts,” to understand that they view women 
negatively, and in a humiliating or degrading way. The harasser need not close 
the circle with reference to the plaintiff specifically: “and you are a ‘bitch,’ 
too.”72 
The court noted that even general vulgarity can operate to discriminate 
against women because it subjects them uniquely to “disadvantageous terms or 
conditions of employment,” in contravention of Title VII.73 As the court noted: 
[A] substantial portion of the words and conduct alleged in this case may 
reasonably be read as gender-specific, derogatory, and humiliating. . . . A jury . 
. . could find on this record that . . . conduct in the office contributed to 
conditions that were humiliating and degrading to women on account of their 
gender. . . . Like “bitch,” “whore” is traditionally used to refer only to women. 
. . . The social context . . . allows for the inference . . . that the abuse did not 
amount to simple teasing, offhand comments, or isolated incidents, but rather 
constituted repeated and intentional discrimination directed at women as a 
group. . . . It is not fatal to her claim that Reeves’s co-workers never directly 
called her a “bitch,” a “fucking whore,” or a “cunt.”74 
Further, the court went so far as to reject the notion that using gendered 
terms to address and describe people of both sexes, rather than being “neutral” 
 
 68. Id. at 807. 
 69. Id. at 810. 
 70. Reeves, 594 F.3d at 810. 
 71. Id. at 811. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 811–12. 
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and nondiscriminatory, is very much discriminatory “because of sex.”75 
“Calling a man a ‘bitch’ belittles him precisely because it belittles women. . . . 
Indeed, it insults the man by comparing him to a woman, and, thereby, could 
be taken as humiliating to women as a group as well.”76 
This case certainly took behavior that might be seen as hovering on the 
periphery of Title VII and extended its application past where many believed it 
should go because it perceived that that application would best serve the broad 
remedial goals of the statute. I have found many students’ reactions to this 
case’s outcome to be overwhelmingly negative, with many, including women 
in the class, voicing the view that women need to “toughen up” and rejecting 
the view that women, as a class, would be uniquely affected by such behavior. 
Interestingly, some of the most vocal students on this point in the recent past 
have been women, and many have shared personal stories about the types of 
work environments that they have experienced, and how they either acclimated 
and “toughed it out,” even if it pained them, or decided to move on, an option, 
they noted, that is available to anyone. 
I have had to be extremely mindful when trying to generate discussion 
among such students, who have often been lifelong achievers, both shielded 
and promoted by the artifice and virtual meritocracy that is school. Students, 
irrespective of their politics or ambitions, need an understanding of the context 
in which antidiscrimination laws have been passed and operated and with a 
grasp of the notion that the whole point of these laws is precisely to make it 
such that those who are adversely affected because of their protected class 
status, like their sex, are not issued an ultimatum that they either accept the 
disparate treatment or the disparate impact conferred in the workplace or 
“move along.” Once they have these things, if they determine that they 
disagree with a particular application or expansion of a law or doctrine, this 
informed opinion contributes to the richness and diversity of viewpoint that a 
good discussion or debate should have. 
However, without a proper understanding of context—the history of 
discrimination, its evolution, manifestations, and impact, as well as the 
legislation passed to regulate and prohibit it—students can lapse into blind 
recitations of personal narratives and pat answers like “deal with it,” that speak 
to their personal frustrations with others’ difficulties with workplace speech 
and culture.77 These reactions might occur without consideration of whether 
the structural and societal forces—the status quo—that engender the speech 
 
 75. See Reeves, 594 F.3d at 813. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1, at 758 (“Analyzing employment discrimination law 
within the historical context in which Title VII and many other civil rights statutes arose is 
necessary to understanding not only the basis of the area’s burden-shifting frameworks but also 
their application to factual situations.”). 
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and culture are inherently problematic and in need of reform. Once this 
consideration has occurred, a rejection of this possibility, from my point of 
view as an educator, is fine. But it is my goal to guide the discussion, challenge 
assumptions, and cultivate empathy for those in the shoes of litigants—on both 
sides of the aisle—and to provide insight into the policy considerations that 
inform their views. 
Thus, I try to play “devil’s advocate” as often as possible, asking a student, 
for example, who has advocated for a widespread expansion of Title VII’s 
application, whether we wouldn’t, in fact, be in danger of creating a civility 
code out of the statute if we did so, and allowing courts to deprive employers 
of deference to which they are entitled and to sit as the “super personnel” 
departments that the Supreme Court has admonished them to avoid becoming. 
My goal is to arm them to work on either side of a case with clarity and insight 
into how the other side will proceed and the arguments that it will make. When 
preparing students to represent or to better understand defendants in 
employment cases, I ensure that we discuss things like employer prerogative 
and managerial discretion and the right of an employer to ensure the smooth 
and efficient running of its workplace and operations. We discuss how to build 
arguments to favor employer-sided policies and outcomes in and under the 
law. I attempt to do the same when it comes to articulating the views and 
arguments of plaintiffs when it comes to jurisprudence and individual 
outcomes. But when met with the overwhelming view from a class that even 
behavior like that in Reeves, found to be actionable by a court of appeals, is 
something that needs to be “dealt with” and “gotten over,” I need to challenge 
assumptions from the other end of the spectrum. 
I have, then, raised issues in class like the history of discrimination and 
harassment and the impact that they have had on women’s achievement of 
power, status, and compensation in the workplace. I have used statistics to 
illustrate the stark disparity between men and women when it comes to 
presence and power in the highest echelons of employment.78 We have also 
 
 78. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1980 (“[T]he gap between the proportion of females to males 
enrolled in college has only grown since 1991, with women comprising the majority (56 percent) 
of college students (estimated to number about 11.3 million female students). . . . [W]hile the 
chasm between the employment rates of young male and female workers has indeed become 
smaller . . . men have continued to hold a larger percentage of the workforce than females across 
all levels of education. . . . Focusing specifically on the professional workplace . . . the highest 
level concentrations of power, compensation, recognition, and longevity in the professional 
workplace—the disparity between those who have traditionally occupied the highest levels, men, 
and those who have not, women, remains as glaring as ever.”); Richard Pérez-Peña, U.S. 
Bachelor Degree Rate Passes Milestone, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/02/24/education/census-finds-bachelors-degrees-at-record-level.html (“For many years, 
colleges have enrolled and graduated more women than men, and a historic male advantage in 
higher education has nearly been erased. In 2001, men held a 3.9 percentage-point lead in 
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discussed more practical issues, like how difficult it may be in a bad economy 
to “move on” and get another, comparable job, in the face of behavior, 
actionable or not, that impacts an employee uniquely because of sex (or race, 
etc.), and we have questioned why someone, in light of the legislation and its 
goals, should have to. It has been interesting, in that vein, to challenge the 
assumption that “because I (or others) dealt with sexist or racist behavior, you 
should be able to also,” and to discuss (with our very diverse student body) the 
dynamics and mechanics of intra-protected-class relations and to discuss same 
race and same-sex discrimination. 
Questions about how the perpetuation of the status quo by the very people 
that have been forced to endure it and the effects of that cycle are invariably 
introduced, by both the students and me, and students are forced to engage 
with the attitudes, beliefs, and insights that underlie their own initial “gut” 
reactions. I have, more recently, thought about inviting in guest speakers who 
are newly minted lawyers so that students can hear from others in their field 
and not much further along than they, themselves, are, the difference between 
the idea that someone should be able to endure certain treatment or survive a 
certain culture and the realities of having to do so. Finally, the realities of the 
legal job market come up periodically in class as we discuss practice, 
opportunities, and carving out a professional niche for oneself within the 
subject matter. It is thus relatively easy to challenge the notion of perfect 
portability contemplated by the “if she doesn’t like the treatment, why doesn’t 
she just leave” comments. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, it is not the students’ ultimate views on any particular 
application, doctrine, statute or holding that matters, but their exposure to the 
strategies, arguments, insights, and considerations of those with whom they 
disagree that will make them better attorneys, capable of forming informed 
opinions that they can successfully defend. I look forward to continuing to 
challenge my students’ beliefs and getting them to be able to recite and defend 
the arguments that will likely be coming at them from the other side of 
whichever side of the aisle they choose. I also look forward to seeing how 
societal beliefs evolve on the topic of sex equality and civil rights, and how 
those beliefs show up in my classroom. 
 
 
 
bachelor’s degrees and 2.6 percentage points in graduate degrees; by last year, both gaps were 
down to 0.7 percent.”); see also Highlight of Women’s Earnings in 2011, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., (Oct. 2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2011.pdf (“In 
2011, women who were full-time wage and salary workers had median usual weekly earnings of 
$684, about 82 percent of median earnings for male full-time wage and salary workers ($832).”). 
